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The Hungarian Government intends to increase the photovoltaic capacities installed in the country
sixfold between 2020 and 2030. New investment is encouraged by a floating premium support system in
which producers sell electricity on the market and can thus have a direct impact on prices. This article
simulates hourly volumes and price data in a Cournot equilibrium model, taking into account the
technical and economic characteristics of electricity producers. The model was calibrated with Hungarian
data from 2019 and then a theoretical year of 2030 was simulated at different market concentrations. The
results show that if prices are above premium levels, operators may reduce their production and thus
increase prices as market concentration increases. This phenomenon could dampen the expected price
reduction despite the increasing penetration of zero marginal cost solar capacities and threaten the
country’s renewable production commitments for 2030. Below the premium level, the effect of market
power does not prevail, and prices can nose-dive. In this case, renewable production targets are achieved,
but the state’s premium subsidy payments are significantly increased. Sensitivity analysis shows that the
amount of new photovoltaic capacities and increased electricity demand both increase the effects of
market power.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, the two key objectives of the European Union’s
energy policy e the liberalisation and decarbonisation of the
electricity market e have been converging. In the past, most
Member States provided contractually fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT) for
renewable producers, which have effectively stimulated in-
vestments but made a limited contribution to the market integra-
tion of these participants [1]. This distortion runs counter to therch, Development and Inno-
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ier Ltd. This is an open access artiliberalisation efforts, and therefore, in 2014 the European Com-
mission issued a decision requiring Member States to replace their
FIT with feed-in premium (FIP) starting from 2017 [2]. The point of
FIP is that producers must sell on the market and receive a pre-
mium over the selling price (the choice of the exact premium logic
remains a Member State competence). Thus, producers entering
the new support system make sales decisions on a market basis, in
which strategic behaviour may appear.
Renewable technologies are less sensitive to economies of scale
than fossil fuels, creating opportunities for smaller investors to
enter the market, which could lead to decentralisation and
increased competition [3]. In contrast, non-residential renewable
projects often show neither territorial nor market decentralisation.
New capacities are often developed in a concentrated area and
ownership structure, in line with the established oligopolistic
market structure. Although in the case of weather-dependent re-
newables, the actual wind strength and sunshine determine the
maximum capacity of producers, they can control the amount
produced between their minimum and maximum capacity (see for
example [4] for solar power plants). Therefore, if renewable pro-
ducers entering themarket become price-makers due to ownership





HEPURA Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory
Authority
MAVIR Mavir Hungarian Transmission System Operator Ltd.
Indices and sets
I set of competing power plants
i competing power plant index
n number of competing power plants





action set (interval defined by boundaries) of
plant i at time t, MWh
Parameters and constants
ci;t marginal cost power plant i at time t, V$MWh1
Ci;t maximum theoretical capacity of plant i at time t,
MWh
gi up-down gradient of plant i, MW
F premium level for FIP producers
q0;t exogenous electricity production
Variables and functions
qi;t electricity production of plant i at time t, MWh
Pt model price at time t
Qt sum of all production at time t, MWh
at the constant parameter of the affine inverse demand
function at time t
rt the slope parameter of the affine inverse demand
function at time t
Pi;t profit of plant i at time t, V
J Nikaido-Isoda function
Z optimum response function
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857restraining some of their production. Thus, their revenues can be
higher if they limit their production and sell for a high market price
as opposed to producing at full capacity. As EU member states
devote significant financial and intellectual resources to increase
the penetration of renewable energy sources, it is in the com-
munity’s best interest to understand how such distortions can
reduce the efficiency of resource utilisation, and raise prices.
One of the most common approaches in the literature to study
oligopolistic behaviour between electricity producers is the Cour-
not competition framework [5]. Previously, a few articles examined
the impact of renewable producers and government interventions
on the operation of deregulated electricity markets. The results
showed that without subsidies, the effect of increasing renewable
capacities on prices depends on the ownership structure: an in-
crease in market concentration can increase the expected value of
prices [6] and volatility [7]. Nevertheless, subsidies have an impact
on the behaviour of firms. Producers in the FIT system are not
characterised by strategic behaviour and are therefore independent
of Cournot competition [8]. Thus, in the FIT, renewables displace
conventional power plants [9]. In contrast, Dressler [10] compared
in a theoretical framework the firms’ strategic behaviour in the FIP
and the FIT systems and found that strategic behaviour appears in
the former, and curtailed production may jeopardize countries’
renewable energy commitments. However, to better understand
the potential strategic behaviour of FIP-supported renewable pro-
ducers, Dressler’s theoretical findings need to be examined in a
complex market environment.
The main contribution of this article is to be the first to examine
the strategic behaviour of FIP-supported photovoltaic producers by
taking into account the real ownership structure and market pro-
cesses of a country. Currently, only FIT-supported power plants
operate in Hungary, but the government aims to achieve its 2030
policy goals primarily with new FIP-supported photovoltaic ca-
pacities [11]. This paper examines the impact that increasedmarket
concentration of new producers may have onmarket prices and the
achievement of renewable energy targets. To this end, a dynamic,
multi-stakeholder Cournot model was calibrated, based on 2019
Hungarian power plant portfolio, ownership structure, technolog-
ical constraints, fuel prices andweather data. Then, the power plant
portfolio and electricity demand were modified based on the
Hungarian government’s energy strategy for 2030: FIP-supported2
installed photovoltaic capacity was increased by 4000 MW, old
fossil power plants were closed, and electricity demand increased
by 25% [11]. All other parameters remained unchanged. Newly
entering photovoltaic capacities were distributed equally among a
varying number of owners, and the simulations were run sepa-
rately for each owner number. The effect of market power was
illustrated by a decrease in the volume of monthly solar production
and an increase in average market prices. Finally, a sensitivity
analysis was performed on electricity demand, installed photo-
voltaic capacity, and FIP level.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the
appliedmethodology: the Cournot model, its assumptions, the data
used and its sources. Section 3 presents the results of the study.
Finally, Section 4 summarises the main conclusions of the research
and future works.2. Methodology
This section details the Cournot equilibrium model setup, the
concept of calibration and data. The general assumptions of the
model are detailed in Appendix A. The flowchart for the work
performed is shown in Fig. 1.
The methodology used consists of three distinct parts: calibra-
tion, simulation, and sensitivity analysis. In the first, the equilib-
rium model was calibrated on 2019 data. During simulation, the
calibrated model was run for the 2030 inputs. Finally, a sensitivity
analysis was performed for the key variables.2.1. Equilibrium model setup
Let I denote the set of competing power plants with jIj ¼ n. The
time dimension is indexed by t2T, where each t represents an hour
in the electricity market. Each power plant i2I is characterised by
its marginal cost of production ci;t2R at time t2T and capacity
constraints ½0;Ci;t 3R. Marginal costs vary in time due to fuel cost
changes, while capacity constraints are constant for regular power
plants but do change for solar plants and wind turbines due to
weather effects [10]. The exact calculations for marginal costs and
capacity constraints are detailed in Appendix B.
Power plant i2I is also characterised by its up-down gradient
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the model.
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857gi >0. The up-down gradient denotes the plant’s speed of adjust-
ment which it is able to change its electricity production from
one hour to the next with. Assume that power plant i2 I produces





3½0;Ci;t  evolves endogenously according to
its up-down gradient in the following way:
ai;tþ1 ¼max





Ci;t ; qi;t þ gi

which in simple terms means that next period production may
differ from current output by the adjustment speed of the power
plant, but cannot be larger than maximum theoretical capacity Ci;t
or smaller than minimum theoretical capacity (zero).
The (inverse) demand function is denoted by PtðQtÞ for each t2
T , where Qt ¼ q0;t þ
P
i2I
qi;t is the sum of all electricity production,
and q0;t is electricity production we consider exogenous.
1 Due to1 The single nuclear power plant (Paks) due to its size, renewables producing in
the FIT system, and cross-border flows because the investigation of their behaviour
is out of the scope of this paper.
3
the strong seasonality of electricity consumption, the demand
function is assumed to change over time [12]. The affine specifi-
cation for the (inverse) demand function is:
PtðQtÞ¼at  rtQt
Pi;t denotes the profit function of plant i at time t. The standard





¼ PtðQtÞ ci;t	qi;t ; (1)
where qi;t ¼ ðq0;t ; q1;t ;…; qi1;t ;…; qiþ1;t ;…; qn;tÞ2Rn. Expected
changes in the premium subsidy system for 2030 mean that the
profit function of certain power plants is different to Eq. (1). In the
floating premium system (FIP), solar power plants also have to
compete in the market, but if the market price is below a particular
fixed level F, the state subsidises them up to this level. Thus, the





¼ maxðPtðQtÞ; FÞ ci;t	qi;t (2)
Power plants are competing in the market, and they simulta-
neously solve their profit maximisation problem, sequentially in
time (see for example in Ref. [7,13e15]). This also means that in the
setup power plants act in a myopic manner, even though their
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857choice of production does have a future effect through their
evolving action set due to their up-down gradient. The decision
variable of power plants is the amount of electricity they produce:
qi;t2Ai;t . The model is seeking the production profiles ðqi;t ;…; qn;tÞ
2Rn ct2T which meets the following criteria:









cq0i;t 2Ai;t and ci2 I;ct2T
The model is seeking a sequence of pure Nash equilibria in a
market where power plants can choose their production from a
closed interval in each period, and their profit function is quadratic.
The equilibrium production vector can be found by applying the
relaxation algorithm of Krawczyk and Uryasev [16], which is based
on the so-called Nikaido-Isoda [17] function. The algorithm is
briefly described below, but a detailed description can be found in
Refs. [16]. The time dimension has been neglected. Let q ¼ ðq1;…;















Function Z returns2 the production vector that is optimal for
each power plant in the sense that it maximises their profit if they
unilaterally change to it. Let q02A be a first estimate for the Nash
equilibrium. Let the recursion
qsþ1 ¼ð1 bsÞqsþ bsZðqsÞ; s¼0;1;…
be such that 0< bs  1 and
P∞
s¼0bs ¼ ∞ and lims/∞bs ¼ 0. Then
the main theorem of [16] says that q+ ¼ lims/∞qs is a Nash equi-
librium. Numerical experimentation proved that bs ¼ 1s cs work
well for the model.2.2. Calibration on 2019 data and simulation for 2030
Computations are divided into two parts: calibration (on 2019
data) and then simulation quasi-ceteris paribus for 2030. Due to this
duality, some variables are endogenous during calibration and
exogenous during estimation.
The two non-observable quantities of the model described in
the previous section are the two parameters (intercept at and slope
rt) of the affine demand function. These quantities are calibrated on
2019 data. For the year of 2019, calibration was performed ac-
cording to two variables: the hourly electricity prices P+t on the
day-ahead market and the total electricity consumption Q+t . The
output of the equilibrium-seeking algorithm is the production
vector qt of power plants and Pt prices for each t. During calibration,2 In general, Z is not a function. In this case, however, it is single-valued, so it is a
function.
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the model looks for ðat ; rtÞt2T vectors for which in equilibrium Qt





 < ε ct2T (3)


Pt  P+t 

/min ct2T (4)
The first condition means that total production produced by the
model should not deviate significantly from the total production
observed during the calibration period, demand must be met by
supply. The second condition means that the equilibrium price
calculated by the model should not deviate significantly from the
market price observed during the calibration period.
The calibration is performed in several steps. In the first step, a
grid was taken in rt , the extent of which can vary between the
smallest and largest elasticity parameters previously measured
according to the literature of Lijesen [18]. At each point of the grid,
we look for the vector ða1;…;ajT jÞ that satisfy the first condition at
that constant rt . Qt is monotone in at , so if Qt þ ε<Q+t in a given t,
at was set to be higher and vice versa. The iteration continues until
condition (3) is met, so for every r in the grid a ða1;…;ajT jÞ vector is
arrived at. In the second step, the rt which implies an equilibrium
price Pt closest to the observed P+t is selected from the grid, for each
t.
During the 2030 simulation, a quasi-ceteris paribus concept was
applied, which means that where credible predictions for input
parameters were available in the literature, they were modified,
elsewhere they were assumed to be unchanged. Therefore, the
elasticity parameter rt of the demand functions does not change
from the one calibrated on 2019 data, while the intercept at is
increased by 25% in line with projections of growing power de-
mand for 2030 [11]. The output of these simulations is the quan-
tities produced ðqtÞt2T by the power plants and the resulting prices
ðPtÞt2T during the year. Of these, this paper primarily discusses
total solar power production and prices in Section 3.2.3. Data
This subsection presents the data used for the calibration, which
can be divided into three categories: installed capacity, weather
data, and prices. The parameters, that were modified in the 2030
simulation and that remained unchanged according to the quasi-
ceteris paribus approach, are detailed for each category. The cali-
bration was performed for each hour of the 2019 year. And the
output of the 2030 simulation was also a year-long, hourly fre-
quency series.
For the calibration, the current power plant database was
reviewed based on the production licenses issued by the Hungarian
Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (HEPURA). Themain
attributes of each unit are the gross installed capacity, the tech-
nology and fuel, and the expiration date of the license [19]. Based
on HEPURA 2019 data, 7815 MW of active installed capacity was
identified for a total number of 560 units. In the case of fuels;
biogas, biomass, landfill gas, sewage gas and waste energy are all
treated as biomass. The sum of permanent shortage and surplus
was subtracted from the gross installed capacity for each unit, and
the resulting available permanent capacity was taken into account
as the maximum capacity. The efficiency ratios and speeds of
adjustment to each block were also assigned from the joint publi-
cation of the Mavir Hungarian Transmission System Operator Ltd.
(MAVIR) and HEPURA [20] for large power plants. The small power
plants’ specifications were based on the large ones with the same
fuel type proportionally. Units with the same owners were linked
together, i.e. portfolios were created that represent the players of
Fig. 2. Monthly distribution of aggregate demand (blue line, left axis) and photovoltaic production (orange line, right axis) in 2019. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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with the most significant 15 controlling 83% of capacity.
As there is no forecast of future changes in the ownership
structure, all units whose license extends to 2030 were considered
with the same ownership structure for the 2030 simulations.
Following the quasi-ceteris paribus concept, the existing power
plant structure was modified for the simulation at two points: the
closure of obsolete power plants and the entry of new photovoltaic
capacities according to the Hungarian energy strategy. Due to the
licenses expiring by 2030, it was expected to see the closure of coal
capacity and the reduction of natural gas capacity from3300MW to
2970 MW. The National Energy and Climate Plan of Hungary [11]
aims to increase the installed capacity with 4000 MW new FIP-
supported photovoltaic units; therefore, this amount was added
to the simulation. The impact of the concentration was examined
with a theoretical approach, in which the new photovoltaic ca-
pacities to be built are equally distributed among a variable number
of competing firms. In this case, the increase in the number of
producers reduces market concentration and thus leads to
increased competition.
Generally, the results of electricity market models are suscep-
tible to demand and weather inputs [21]. The source of hourly
frequency weather, demand and production data used for calibra-
tion was the MAVIR database. In 2019, 29.7% of electricity demand
was met by imports, 35.9% from nuclear power, 17.6% from natural
gas, 9% from coal, 1.7% from wind, 2.1% from solar and 3.9% from
other resources.3 Fig. 2 shows themonthly distribution of aggregate
demand and photovoltaic production. It shows a characteristic
difference between winter when heating boosted demand but the
low number of hours of sunshine kept photovoltaic production
small, and summer (mainly August and September) when relatively
low demand was met by large amounts of the photovoltaic output.
In line with the Climate Plan’s [11] forecast, in the 20303 Biomass, biogas, hydro, waste incineration, landfill gas and sewage gas.
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simulation, demand (the parameter at) was increased by 25% every
hour. The shape of the wind and solar profiles has been left un-
changed, but the latter has been scaledwith the capacities expected
to be installed, thus marking the maximum solar production po-
tentials. The hourly output of exogenous actors [22] remained un-
changed in the 2030 simulation.
The fuel prices used for calibration were estimated on the basis
of themarket benchmarksmost often used byHungarian producers
[22]. Gas prices were based on average daily prices from the Central
Eastern European Gas Exchange spot market and range from 10.51
2MWh1 to 24.89V$MWh1 [23]. Carbon quota prices were based
on the European Emission Trading System and range from 18.35 2
t1 to 29.46V$t1 [24]. Oil prices were proxied by Brent daily prices
and range from 55.38 $MWh1 to 75.01 $$MWh1 [24]. The cost of
nuclear fuel was estimated at 3 V$MWh1 , coal at 5 V$MWh1 ,
and biomass at 7 V$MWh1 , which were estimated from the 2018
business reports of the companies using these fuels. For model
calibration, Hungarian Power Exchange day-ahead electricity
market prices were used [25]. As fuel prices are not forecast for
2030, they are unchanged in the simulation.
In 2019, no FIP-supported power plant was operating in
Hungary, so it did not have to be taken into account in the cali-
bration. The HEPURA announced the results of the first FIP tender
on March 27, 2020 in which the average premium level of large
producers was 64 V$MWh1 [26]. Therefore, this premium level
was assumed in the 2030 simulation. Following the simulation, a
sensitivity analysis was performed for three parameters: demand
growth, the amount of installed photovoltaic capacities, and pre-
mium level. The results of the investigation are presented in Section
3.3. Results and discussion
This section details the results of the benchmark simulation and
sensitivity analysis. The 2030 benchmark simulation examined
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857how the ownership structure of newly installed FIP-supported
photovoltaic producers affects prices and volumes produced. To
this end, the model distributed capacity equally among a variable
number of owners and generated separate output for each number
of owners. Subsequently, a sensitivity analysis was run for three
variables (demand, FIP level, amount of new capacity), the results of
which showed how the modification of the variables affects the
restraint of photovoltaic production. Finally, the section discusses
the limitations of the results.3.1. Benchmark simulation
The two main outputs of the benchmark simulation are the
volumes produced by power plants and market prices. The model
was run for each hour of the year, so the output vector consists of
8760 data points for prices and productions of each competing
power plant. For the sake of clarity, the data presented are aggre-
gated monthly for the quantities produced and averaged for the
prices. Three-dimensional diagrams were used for the represen-
tation, showing the number of months on one axis, the number of
owners on the other axis, and a decrease in photovoltaic production
and an increase in average prices on the third axis. The newly
installed capacities were distributed equally among the owners.
The results of the simulations showed that if new photovoltaic
capacity is distributed among more than 15 FIP owners, they
become price-takers and their market power is eliminated.
Therefore, the results were plotted from 1 to 15 owners. In the
model, owners can influence market prices by reducing their pro-
duction, so Fig. 3 shows the ratio of aggregate photovoltaic pro-
duction to the theoretical maximum.
As a result of the increase in ownership concentration, the effect
of market power increases significantly, making it increasingly
worthwhile for producers to reduce their production in order to
increase market prices and thus their profits. The effect is non-
linear; thus, if capacities are distributed among one ownerFig. 3. Monthly production by number of FIP solar plants. Monthly production is the rati
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instead of two, the degree of restraint is more than double. In
addition to ownership concentration, weather and demand also
influence production decisions (for comparison, see Fig. 2). Irradi-
ation determines the maximum useable capacity of photovoltaic
producers, and thus their market power, so the restraint of pro-
duction is the strongest in August, as the 2019 benchmark year also
had the highest irradiation. The January results show that high
demand will also increase the market power of photovoltaic pro-
ducers despite their low capacity at the time because demandmust
be met by supply and solar plants compete mainly with higher
marginal cost power plants. The results of September and October
also support this phenomenon, as although the theoretically
available maximum photovoltaic production was higher in
September, the reduction of production was lower due to lower
demand. In the case of a single FIP solar plant, yearly photovoltaic
production is 26.7% less than production in the perfectly competi-
tive case.
The primary motivation behind the production reduction of
price-maker solar power plants is the increase in market prices.
Fig. 4 shows that market power can have a significant impact on
market prices: for a single FIP photovoltaic producer, the simulation
resulted in a 29.9% increase in average prices for August. Average
prices fall to a lesser extent than the restraint of production, which
is because every hour is given equal weight in the average of prices.
In contrast, the theoretical maximum of production of a given hour
is the benchmark for the produced quantities. In fact, during the
hours when the theoretical maximum of photovoltaic production is
high, the rate of price growth may exceed the rate of production
restraint. For example, the most significant production reduction
was simulated at noon on the 5th of September (423 MWh
photovoltaic production against 3797 MWh potential) and it
resulted in a price ofV126 instead ofV0 in perfect competition. The
V0price in perfect competition is because the Hungarian FIP sys-
tem does not pay a subsidy if the price is below it. Without this
bound, the price may decrease further to the negative area.o of actual production and maximum capacity (taking sunshine-hour into account).
Fig. 4. Monthly average price increase by number of FIP solar plants.
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The inputs of the benchmark simulation differ themost from the
calibration in the growth of electricity demand, installation of new
photovoltaic capacities and introduction of the FIP support system.
Therefore a sensitivity analysis was performed for these three high
priority variables. The results of the sensitivity analysis were
plotted for effect on production reduction for all three variables
because these results are more pronounced than the impact on
average prices.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of changing the FIP level on production
reduction. The benchmark simulation was calculated at the level of
64 V$MWh1 formed in the only auction held in Hungary earlier.Fig. 5. Dependence of reduced FIP solar production on premium level.
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The upper level of the sensitivity analysis range was set at 100
V$MWh1 based on the results of past German photovoltaic FIP
auctions (the previous highest level in April 2015 was
91.7V$MWh1 [27]). 0 V$MWh1 was selected for the lower level
because no support can be paid in Hungary below this value.
Fig. 5 shows that as the FIP level increases, the production
reduction decreases. This is because if market prices are below the
premium level, it does not matter to photovoltaic producers how
much the difference between the premium level and the price is.
After all, they will receive revenue corresponding to the premium
level per unit of electricity produced. In this case, the actors aim to
produce as much electricity as possible. It is only worthwhile for
photovoltaic producers to use their market power if prices (even as
a result of reduced production) exceed the level of the premium,
because only then can they increase their profits. As a result of the
change in the premium level, a break can be observed at
40V$MWh1 , which is because prices fall relatively infrequently
below this value. In parallel, with the increase in the level of the
premium, the reduction in production also flattens out, because
prices rarely rise above a certain level. However, the upper level is
strongly influenced by ownership concentration, as its growth also
increases the frequency of high prices. Within a specific interval
(depending on the concentration of ownership), the FIP level has a
substantial effect on the reduction in production.
The increase in electricity demand in the benchmark simulation
was assumed to be 25%. Still, as this is quite an uncertain estima-
tion, a sensitivity analysis was conducted and is shown in Fig. 6. As
no other forecast was published for the variable, the study was
conducted between 0% to 50% growth extremes.
Although the results of the benchmark simulation showed that
an increase in demand raises the phenomenon of production
reduction, based on the sensitivity analysis, this is only accurate
above a certain level of demand. Fig. 6 shows that below a certain
level of demand (varying according to ownership concentration),
Fig. 6. Dependence of reduced FIP solar production on demand growth.
Fig. 7. Dependence of reduced FIP solar production on new solar capacity.
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for this phenomenon is that it is not worthwhile for conventional
power plants to produce up to a certain price level because their
short-term marginal costs exceed market prices. In this interval,
photovoltaic producers have considerable market power and can
have a significant impact on prices by reducing their production.
However, as demand and thus prices rise, more and more con-
ventional power plants will enter, with which solar power plants
will have to compete, and this will reduce their market power. As
demand continues to grow, the effect will be reversed, as photo-
voltaic producers will be needed to maintain the balance of the
system, and their market power will thus increase again. This
second phase of market power growth is flatter due to greater
competition.
Finally, the third variable for which a sensitivity analysis was
performed is the amount of new capacity installed. The benchmark
simulation assumed 4000 MWof new photovoltaic capacity as it is
the official target of current energy policy, but a sensitivity analysis
was conducted in the range of 2000 MW to 6000 MW. The results
are shown in Fig. 7.
Like irradiation, the amount of installed capacity determines the
theoretical maximum of production, and thus the market power of
producers. If a higher amount of capacity is concentrated in a
smaller number of owners, the market power of photovoltaic
producers will be greater, and they will thus be more interested in
reducing their production. The impact of changes in new capacities
is more significant if the ownership structure is more concentrated.
3.3. Discussion
The Cournot model built in this paper can handle many complex
effects (technological conditions, ownership conditions, system
equilibrium condition) arising from the properties of the electricity
system, but at the same time, impacts that limit the practical
applicability of the results remain. One significant limitation is that
while the model only looks at the spot market, in reality, power
generators can sell in several different markets. Also, as the in-
dustry develops, new markets (such as flexibility markets) may
emerge. However, increasing the number of markets requires the
implementation of new behavioural patterns of firms, and these
further constraints are outside the scope of the article.
Another limitation is that the new owners considered in the8
simulation only hold a portfolio of photovoltaic production units. In
contrast, it is conceivable that owners will diversify their portfolios
and operate other generation and storage technologies in addition
to photovoltaic units. In this case, the owners maximise the profit
for the entire portfolio, which can lead to different results as if
optimised separately for photovoltaic production units. The article
does not examine mixed portfolios for new entrants because of the
reduction in photovoltaic production in these would also be influ-
enced by the composition of the portfolio, which would skew the
results.
Finally, the model assumes the short-run marginal cost of
photovoltaic producers to be zero because these actors do not have
fuel and carbon quota costs. On the one hand, photovoltaic pro-
ducers can ramp-down their production flexibly and free of charge
[4], so the assumption is acceptable. On the other hand, in the spot
market, producers have to submit their bids no more than one day
before delivery, and the maximum capacity of solar cells cannot be
predicted with perfect accuracy in advance. Thus, the unpredict-
ability of weather poses a new risk element for photovoltaic pro-
ducers over conventional power plants, which can be interpreted as
a short-run marginal cost, making the assumption questionable.
One of the main difficulties in modelling photovoltaic pro-
ducers’ decisions is that while there are large amounts of obser-
vations on the use of market power and cost-benefit considerations
for conventional power plants, this experience is not yet available
for renewable producers. Since, to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, empirical evidence is not yet available to demonstrate that
the high ownership concentration of renewable capacities in a
market has made individual owners price-makers, potential future
effects can only be examined under certain assumptions. However,
they are worth addressing ex-ante so that policy can prepare for
their eventuality.4. Conclusion and future work
The Hungarian Government predicts the realisation of a signif-
icant amount of FIP-supported new photovoltaic investment by
2030. This article examined in the Cournot framework the potential
impact of market power associated with the possible ownership
concentration of new capacity on price and on electricity generated
by solar panels. Calibration of the model was performed based on
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857data from 2019, and then the effect of the new units was examined
quasi-ceteris paribus by 2030. A sensitivity analysis was performed
for the three main inputs that changed compared to the 2019 pa-
rameters: growth of electricity demand, FIP support level, and new
photovoltaic capacities.
The paper concludes that the potential impact of market power
is influenced by ownership concentration, maximum energy that
can be produced by solar panels, electricity demand, the cost
structure of conventional power plants, and FIP levels. In the ex-
amination of ownership concentration, new capacities were
distributed equally among a varying number of companies. The
results showed that photovoltaic producers become price-makers
in some periods when the number of owners falls below 15. The
most substantial influence can be observed in the monopoly
structure, where the amount of annual electricity produced by solar
panels is 26.7% lower than in a perfectly competitive market in the
benchmark simulation. This results in a 7.92% increase in annual
average prices. The higher the available solar cell production is in a
period, the higher the market power of the owners, so both the
amount of installed capacity and the intensity of irradiation have a
positive effect on the production reduction activity. With low de-
mand and price, the market power of photovoltaic producers is
high, however, as they begin to rise, producing becomes worth-
while for more and more conventional power plants, thus reducing
the market power of photovoltaic power plants. However, at a
certain level of demand, the price reaches the short-run marginal
cost of the highest controllable power plant in the merit order, so
that as market demand increases further, the market power of
photovoltaic producers will rise again. Finally, renewable producers
should only use their market power if they can push the price above
the FIP level. Otherwise, it is worth operating at maximum capacity.
Therefore, the higher the FIP level, the less characteristic the pro-
duction reduction behaviour will be.
The main policy lesson to draw from the results of the model is
that, when designing the rules for allocating subsidies, caremust be
taken not to create excessive market concentration, as this may e
through strategic production reduction e hinder price reduction
effects expected from zero marginal cost producers, and endanger
the country’s renewable commitments. Sharp price drops below
the premium level can be considered favourable by consumers, but
on the other hand, they can significantly increase public burdens,
since premium subsidy payments are much higher in these cases.
An undesirable market distortion effect may diminish the market
power of conventional power plants, which may reduce the effec-
tive functioning of market mechanisms.
The two most important areas where the model used in the
article is worth developing in the future are: refining the behaviour
of photovoltaic producers and further implementing the
complexity of the electricity market. Exploring the real cost-benefit
nexus of decision between not selling and selling the solar energy
in the market is an essential condition for making a forecast in
addition to determining the potential for market power. Besides,
both the interactions between individual electricity markets and
the combined optimisation opportunities of different instruments
held in companiesâV™ portfolios can contribute to a better un-
derstanding of the complexity of reality, thus providing a promising
direction for further research.Author contribution
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The following assumptions were used in the model.
1. There is no co-operation between different electricity com-
panies, meaning that one company only seeks to maximise the
profits of its own. This assumption is commonly used in Cournot
models, see, for example, the following articles [7]: [13e15].
2. All the country’s supply and demand meet in a single market.
That is, all consumers purchase the electricity they need in the
modelled spot market and accordingly, each producer sells
there. The reserve market is also not examined, so it does not
change the capacity limits of the players. Contreras et al. [28]
uses similar assumption.
3. Producers decide simultaneously on the amount of electricity to
be produced for a given period and optimise from period to
period independently (see, for example [12]).
4. Cross-border flows, renewables participating in the guaranteed
subsidy scheme and the production Paks nuclear power plant
are assumed to be exogenous. Paizs [22] used a similar
assumption for the Hungarian electricity system.
5. Biomass, biogas, waste incineration, landfill gas, andwastewater
technologies are treated in a combined manner based on both
their technical characteristics and their short-term marginal
costs (see, for example [8]).
6. It is assumed that each fuel type will be available to all partici-
pants at the same price (see, for example [8]).
7. Because of the quasi-ceteris paribus concept, the current
ownership structure is assumed to remain unchanged in 2030
for power plants remaining in the system.
8. As no forecast for FIP levels is available, each participant in the
benchmark model produces based on the scale from the first
Hungarian tender [26]. As this is a crucial variable, a sensitivity
analysis was performed for the premium level.
9. Under the rules of the Hungarian subsidy system, producers are
not entitled to a premium in case of negative prices [29].Appendix B. Calculations of power plant characteristics
The following parameters characterise each i2I power plant:
 fueli2fnuclear;naturalGas; oil; sun;wind;water; biomass; coalg
denotes the fuel type of the power plant.
 globalMaxCapi >0 denotes the plant’s maximum capacity. Unit
of measurement is MWh. (Minimum capacity is assumed to be
zero for all power plants.)
 hi 2ð0;1 denotes the efficiency ratio of the plant.
 gi >0 denotes the plant’s speed of adjustment. Unit of mea-
surement is MW.
 CO2i  0 denotes the plant’s CO2 emissions. Unit of measure-
ment is t$MWh1.
While the characteristics of power plants detailed above do not
change over time, the model also has a time dimension. Fuel costs,
and ultimately the marginal cost of each power plant, change over
time. Capacity limits for certain renewable power plants (solar and
wind) are also changing due to changing weather conditions. The
O. Hortay and A.A. Víg Energy 213 (2020) 118857time dimension is indexed by t2T, where a given t denotes an hour
interval. The following data characterise each hour:
 P+t 2R denotes the spot price of electricity on the DAM market.
Unit of measurement is V$MWh1 .
 Q+t >0 denotes net electricity demand, which by definition is
also equal to the sum of all production and import. Unit of
measurement is MWh.
 cloudt2½0;1 denotes the ratio at which solar plants can produce
compared to their maximum capacity due to weather. This ratio
is trivially zero at night and reaches its highest at or shortly after
noon.
 windt2½0;1 denotes the ratio at which wind turbines can
produce compared to their maximum capacity due to weather.
 CO2quotat >0 denotes the price of CO2 quota. Unit of mea-
surement is V$t1.
 ðnucPt ; coalPt ; gasPt ; oilPt ; sunPt ;windPt ;waterPt ; bioPtÞ2R8 de-
notes the fuel cost of each plant type. Unit of measurement is V
$MWh1 . We note that although the unit of time of the model is
an hour, fuel prices usually do not change hourly. For example,
the cost of nuclear fuel is assumed to be constant in time.
Furthermore, the cost of renewables is assumed to be constant
zero in time. In order to be consistent in the model description,
in general, it was allowed all fuel costs to change hourly.
The following power plant characteristics and decision variables
are time-dependent:
 ci;t >0 denotes the marginal cost of plant i2I at time t2 T . Unit
of measurement is V$MWh1 . Marginal cost is calculated by




 Global capacity constraints change with time for solar and wind
power plants due to changing weather conditions. Demon-
strating this effect for wind turbines:Ci;t ¼ globalMaxCapi,windt
For other plant types Ci;t ¼ globalMaxCapi, ct2 T .
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